Wooing the Generals: India's New Burma Policy
Material type:
- 8172731736
- 23 327 EGRW
Item type | Current library | Collection | Call number | Status | Barcode | |
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St Aloysius Library | Political Science | 327 EGRW (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | GF03324 |
Book Description Condition: As New. Contents: Introduction. I. Historic and geostrategic background: 1. Indo-Burmese relations in history. 2. Geostrategic importance of the region. II. Stakes involved: geopolitical framework of relations between India and Burma/Myanmar: 3. Instability of North-East India: the Burmese connections. 4. The Chinese presence in Myanmar. 5. India's entry into Asia - the Burmese frontier first. III. India's response: tools of Indian diplomacy: 6. India's Burmese policy. 7. Economy as the tool of choice. 8. India's strategy in the Indian Ocean - counter-balancing the Chinese. IV. Problems and prospects: betwixt fantasy and reality: 9. Facts and reality: Indian fantasies and Chinese realpolitik. 10. Burmese military: master of its diplomacy? Appendices. Bibliography. Index.Relations between India and Burma (now Myanmar) date back to the 3 century BC and Burma happened to be the largest province of British India. After a close partnership resulting from Nehru and U Nu's friendship, the advent of a military rule in Burma in 1962 isolated the country by throwing a bamboo curtain on it. India has thus long ignored its eastern neighbour, choosing not to deal with another military regime. With the dramatic up-rising of 1988 and the renewal of the Burmese Junta, the idealist policy India defined towards Myanmar was not altered.But with the launch of its Look East Policy, along with the geopolitical upheaval in Asia's regional order in the 1990s, India's Burma policy showed a radical U-turn. After years of political rejection and isolation of the Burmese Junta, India clearly opted for a realist policy and began to court the Burmese Generals. Since many crucial stakes are involved in the region (including the Chinese thrust in South-East Asia) India could not afford to alienate itself from the Burmese regime. Thus, New Delhi opted for a realist approach and decided to engage the Burmese Military in its own interest. 234 pp. Seller Inventory # 50289
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